Wallace v. Jaffree - School Prayer Silent Meditation

Wallace v. Jaffree - School Prayer Silent Meditation Can public schools endorse or encourage prayer if they do so in the context of endorsing and encouraging silent meditation as well? Some Christians thought this would be a good way to smuggle official prayers back into the school day, but courts rejected their arguments and the Supreme Court found the practice unconstitutional. According to the court, such laws have a religious rather than a secular purpose, though all the justices had different opinions as to why exactly the law was invalid.​ Fast Facts: Wallace v. Jaffree Case Argued: Dec. 4, 1984Decision Issued: June 4, 1985Petitioner: George Wallace, Governor of AlabamaRespondent: Ishmael Jaffree, a parent of three students who attended school in the  Mobile County Public School SystemKey Questions: Did Alabama law violate the First Amendments Establishment Clause in endorsing or encouraging prayer in schools if it did so in the context of endorsing and encouraging silent meditation as well?Majority Decision: Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, OConnorDissenting: Justices Rehnquist, Burger, WhiteRuling: The Supreme Court ruled that an Alabama law providing for a moment of silence was unconstitutional and that Alabamas prayer and meditation statute was not only a deviation from the states duty to maintain absolute neutrality toward religion but was an affirmative endorsement of religion, violating the First Amendment. Background Information At issue was an Alabama law requiring that each school day to  begin with a one minute period of silent meditation or voluntary prayer (the original 1978 law read-only silent meditation, but the words or voluntary prayer were added in 1981). A students parent sued to allege that this law violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it forced students to pray and basically exposed them to religious indoctrination. The District Court permitted the prayers to continue, but the Court of Appeals ruled that they were unconstitutional, so the state appealed to the Supreme Court. Court Decision With Justice Stevens writing the majority opinion, the Court decided 6-3 that the Alabama law providing for a moment of silence was unconstitutional. The important issue was whether the law was instituted for a religious purpose. Because the only evidence in the record indicated that the words or prayer had been added to the existing statute by amendment for the sole purpose of returning voluntary prayer to the public schools, the Court found that the first prong of the Lemon Test had been violated, i.e., that the statute was invalid as being entirely motivated by a purpose of advancing religion. In Justice OConnors concurring opinion, she refined the endorsement test which she first described in: The endorsement test does not preclude government from acknowledging religion or from taking religion into account in making law and policy. It does preclude government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred. Such an endorsement infringes the religious liberty of the nonadherent, for [w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.At issue today is whether state moment of silence statutes in general, and Alabamas moment of silence statute in particular, embody an impermissible endorsement of prayer in public schools. [emphasis added] This fact was clear because Alabama already had a law that allowed school days to begin with a moment for silent meditation. The newer law was expanded the existing law by giving it a religious purpose. The Court characterized this legislative attempt to return prayer to the public schools as quite different from merely protecting every students right to engage in voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during the school day. Significance This decision emphasized the scrutiny the Supreme Court uses when evaluating the constitutionality of government actions. Rather than accept the argument that the inclusion of or voluntary prayer was a minor addition with little practical significance, the intentions of the legislature that passed it was enough to demonstrate its unconstitutionality. One important aspect to this case is that the authors of the majority opinion, two concurring opinions, and all three dissents agreed that a minute of silence at the beginning of each school day would be acceptable. Justice OConnors concurring opinion is notable for its effort to synthesize and refine the Courts Establishment and Free Exercise tests (see also Justices concurring opinion in ). It was here that she first articulated her reasonable observer test: The relevant issue is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it is a state endorsement... Also notable is Justice Rehnquists dissent for its effort to redirect Establishment Clause analysis by abandoning the tripartite test, discarding any requirement that government is neutral between religion and irreligion, and confining the scope to a prohibition on establishing a national church or otherwise favoring one religious group over another. Many conservative Christians today insist that the First Amendment only prohibits the establishment of a national church and Rehnquist clearly bought into that propaganda, but the rest of the court disagreed.

Wallace v. Jaffree - School Prayer Silent Meditation

Wallace v. Jaffree - School Prayer Silent Meditation Can public schools endorse or encourage prayer if they do so in the context of endorsing and encouraging silent meditation as well? Some Christians thought this would be a good way to smuggle official prayers back into the school day, but courts rejected their arguments and the Supreme Court found the practice unconstitutional. According to the court, such laws have a religious rather than a secular purpose, though all the justices had different opinions as to why exactly the law was invalid.​ Fast Facts: Wallace v. Jaffree Case Argued: Dec. 4, 1984Decision Issued: June 4, 1985Petitioner: George Wallace, Governor of AlabamaRespondent: Ishmael Jaffree, a parent of three students who attended school in the  Mobile County Public School SystemKey Questions: Did Alabama law violate the First Amendments Establishment Clause in endorsing or encouraging prayer in schools if it did so in the context of endorsing and encouraging silent meditation as well?Majority Decision: Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, OConnorDissenting: Justices Rehnquist, Burger, WhiteRuling: The Supreme Court ruled that an Alabama law providing for a moment of silence was unconstitutional and that Alabamas prayer and meditation statute was not only a deviation from the states duty to maintain absolute neutrality toward religion but was an affirmative endorsement of religion, violating the First Amendment. Background Information At issue was an Alabama law requiring that each school day to  begin with a one minute period of silent meditation or voluntary prayer (the original 1978 law read-only silent meditation, but the words or voluntary prayer were added in 1981). A students parent sued to allege that this law violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it forced students to pray and basically exposed them to religious indoctrination. The District Court permitted the prayers to continue, but the Court of Appeals ruled that they were unconstitutional, so the state appealed to the Supreme Court. Court Decision With Justice Stevens writing the majority opinion, the Court decided 6-3 that the Alabama law providing for a moment of silence was unconstitutional. The important issue was whether the law was instituted for a religious purpose. Because the only evidence in the record indicated that the words or prayer had been added to the existing statute by amendment for the sole purpose of returning voluntary prayer to the public schools, the Court found that the first prong of the Lemon Test had been violated, i.e., that the statute was invalid as being entirely motivated by a purpose of advancing religion. In Justice OConnors concurring opinion, she refined the endorsement test which she first described in: The endorsement test does not preclude government from acknowledging religion or from taking religion into account in making law and policy. It does preclude government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred. Such an endorsement infringes the religious liberty of the nonadherent, for [w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.At issue today is whether state moment of silence statutes in general, and Alabamas moment of silence statute in particular, embody an impermissible endorsement of prayer in public schools. [emphasis added] This fact was clear because Alabama already had a law that allowed school days to begin with a moment for silent meditation. The newer law was expanded the existing law by giving it a religious purpose. The Court characterized this legislative attempt to return prayer to the public schools as quite different from merely protecting every students right to engage in voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during the school day. Significance This decision emphasized the scrutiny the Supreme Court uses when evaluating the constitutionality of government actions. Rather than accept the argument that the inclusion of or voluntary prayer was a minor addition with little practical significance, the intentions of the legislature that passed it was enough to demonstrate its unconstitutionality. One important aspect to this case is that the authors of the majority opinion, two concurring opinions, and all three dissents agreed that a minute of silence at the beginning of each school day would be acceptable. Justice OConnors concurring opinion is notable for its effort to synthesize and refine the Courts Establishment and Free Exercise tests (see also Justices concurring opinion in ). It was here that she first articulated her reasonable observer test: The relevant issue is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it is a state endorsement... Also notable is Justice Rehnquists dissent for its effort to redirect Establishment Clause analysis by abandoning the tripartite test, discarding any requirement that government is neutral between religion and irreligion, and confining the scope to a prohibition on establishing a national church or otherwise favoring one religious group over another. Many conservative Christians today insist that the First Amendment only prohibits the establishment of a national church and Rehnquist clearly bought into that propaganda, but the rest of the court disagreed.

Wallace v. Jaffree - School Prayer Silent Meditation

Wallace v. Jaffree - School Prayer Silent Meditation Can public schools endorse or encourage prayer if they do so in the context of endorsing and encouraging silent meditation as well? Some Christians thought this would be a good way to smuggle official prayers back into the school day, but courts rejected their arguments and the Supreme Court found the practice unconstitutional. According to the court, such laws have a religious rather than a secular purpose, though all the justices had different opinions as to why exactly the law was invalid.​ Fast Facts: Wallace v. Jaffree Case Argued: Dec. 4, 1984Decision Issued: June 4, 1985Petitioner: George Wallace, Governor of AlabamaRespondent: Ishmael Jaffree, a parent of three students who attended school in the  Mobile County Public School SystemKey Questions: Did Alabama law violate the First Amendments Establishment Clause in endorsing or encouraging prayer in schools if it did so in the context of endorsing and encouraging silent meditation as well?Majority Decision: Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, OConnorDissenting: Justices Rehnquist, Burger, WhiteRuling: The Supreme Court ruled that an Alabama law providing for a moment of silence was unconstitutional and that Alabamas prayer and meditation statute was not only a deviation from the states duty to maintain absolute neutrality toward religion but was an affirmative endorsement of religion, violating the First Amendment. Background Information At issue was an Alabama law requiring that each school day to  begin with a one minute period of silent meditation or voluntary prayer (the original 1978 law read-only silent meditation, but the words or voluntary prayer were added in 1981). A students parent sued to allege that this law violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it forced students to pray and basically exposed them to religious indoctrination. The District Court permitted the prayers to continue, but the Court of Appeals ruled that they were unconstitutional, so the state appealed to the Supreme Court. Court Decision With Justice Stevens writing the majority opinion, the Court decided 6-3 that the Alabama law providing for a moment of silence was unconstitutional. The important issue was whether the law was instituted for a religious purpose. Because the only evidence in the record indicated that the words or prayer had been added to the existing statute by amendment for the sole purpose of returning voluntary prayer to the public schools, the Court found that the first prong of the Lemon Test had been violated, i.e., that the statute was invalid as being entirely motivated by a purpose of advancing religion. In Justice OConnors concurring opinion, she refined the endorsement test which she first described in: The endorsement test does not preclude government from acknowledging religion or from taking religion into account in making law and policy. It does preclude government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred. Such an endorsement infringes the religious liberty of the nonadherent, for [w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.At issue today is whether state moment of silence statutes in general, and Alabamas moment of silence statute in particular, embody an impermissible endorsement of prayer in public schools. [emphasis added] This fact was clear because Alabama already had a law that allowed school days to begin with a moment for silent meditation. The newer law was expanded the existing law by giving it a religious purpose. The Court characterized this legislative attempt to return prayer to the public schools as quite different from merely protecting every students right to engage in voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during the school day. Significance This decision emphasized the scrutiny the Supreme Court uses when evaluating the constitutionality of government actions. Rather than accept the argument that the inclusion of or voluntary prayer was a minor addition with little practical significance, the intentions of the legislature that passed it was enough to demonstrate its unconstitutionality. One important aspect to this case is that the authors of the majority opinion, two concurring opinions, and all three dissents agreed that a minute of silence at the beginning of each school day would be acceptable. Justice OConnors concurring opinion is notable for its effort to synthesize and refine the Courts Establishment and Free Exercise tests (see also Justices concurring opinion in ). It was here that she first articulated her reasonable observer test: The relevant issue is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it is a state endorsement... Also notable is Justice Rehnquists dissent for its effort to redirect Establishment Clause analysis by abandoning the tripartite test, discarding any requirement that government is neutral between religion and irreligion, and confining the scope to a prohibition on establishing a national church or otherwise favoring one religious group over another. Many conservative Christians today insist that the First Amendment only prohibits the establishment of a national church and Rehnquist clearly bought into that propaganda, but the rest of the court disagreed.

Definition and Examples of a Conceptual Metaphor

Definition and Examples of a Conceptual Metaphor A conceptual metaphor is a  metaphor (or figurative comparison) in which one idea (or conceptual domain) is understood in terms of another. In cognitive linguistics, the conceptual domain from which we draw metaphorical expressions to understand another conceptual domain is known as the source domain. The conceptual domain that is understood in this way is the target domain. Thus the source domain of the journey is commonly used to explain the target domain of life. In Metaphors We Live By (1980), George Lakoff and Mark Johnson identify three overlapping categories of conceptual metaphors: Orientational MetaphorOntological MetaphorStructural Metaphor Examples and Observations Basic conceptual metaphors are part of the common conceptual apparatus shared by members of a culture. They are systematic in that there is a fixed correspondence between the structure of the domain to be understood (e.g., death) and the structure of the domain in terms of which we are understanding it (e.g., departure). We usually understand them in terms of common experiences. They are largely unconscious, though attention may be drawn to them. Their operation in cognition is almost automatic. And they are widely conventionalized in language, that is, there are a great number of words and idiomatic expressions in our language whose meanings depend upon those conceptual metaphors. In Metaphors We Live By (University Of Chicago Press, 1980), George Lakoff and Mark Johnson mention these variations on the conceptual metaphor TIME IS MONEY: Youre wasting my time.This gadget will save you hours.I dont have the time to give you.How do you spend your time these days?That flat tire cost me an hour.Ive invested a lot of time in her.Youre running out of time.Is that worth your while?Hes living on borrowed time. Five Tenets of Conceptual; Metaphor Theory Conceptual Metaphor Theory rejects the notion that metaphor is a decorative device, peripheral to language and thought. Instead, the theory holds that metaphor is central to thought, and therefore to language. From this starting point, a number of tenets are derived, which are discussed here with particular reference to language. These tenets are: Metaphors structure thinking;Metaphors structure knowledge;Metaphor is central to abstract language;Metaphor is grounded in physical experience;Metaphor is ideological. Mappings Understanding one domain in terms of another involves a set of fixed correspondences (technically called mappings) between a source and a target domain. This set of mappings obtains between basic constituent elements of the target. To know a conceptual metaphor is to know the set of mappings that applies to a given source-target pairing. It is these mappings that provide much of the meaning of the metaphorical linguistic expressions (or linguistic metaphors) that make a particular conceptual metaphor manifest. Also Known As Generative Metaphor Sources George Lakoff and Mark Turner,  More Than Cool Reason. University of Chicago Press, 1989Alice Deignan,  Metaphor and Corpus Linguistics. John Benjamins, 2005Zoltn Kà ¶vecses,  Metaphor: A Practical Introduction, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2010